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ABSTRACT
The aim of this article is to discuss the use and usefulness of psychological theory 
and psychological methods in the study of religious violence. My analysis of pre-
vious research revealed an imbalance between data, method and theory. There 
are few psychological studies on religious terrorism based on first-hand empir-
ical data. The analysis also showed that psychological explanations of religious 
terrorism are, in general, not sensitive to cultural factors. Religious terrorism is 
a culturally constituted phenomenon. It is therefore important that research on 
religious violence is based on theoretical and empirical approaches sensitive to 
the cultural construction of violence. This means that psychologists of religion 
must be willing to use novel and creative methods sensitive to the unique cultural 
context where the violent behaviour is acted out and interpreted by the actors of 
the violent drama, for example, discourse analysis or narrative research. In the 
self-corrective and growth-inducing feedback process between these methods and 
primary data it would be possible to develop valid psychological explanations of 
religious violence. 
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INTRODUCTION
Religious violence is a global phenomenon, involving all of the world’s major 
religious traditions in one way or another. The theatrical ways the violent 
acts are staged and performed have attracted the media and hence covers 
the headlines of our newspapers and magazines on a regular basis. Religious 
violence is therefore something people talk about in dining rooms and offices 
all over the world, but talking about religious violence is not necessarily 
the same thing as explaining it. Media describe these horrible events and 
sometimes they even try to explain certain aspects of the religious violence in 
the contemporary world. However, these explanations seldom contribute to 
a more thorough understanding of the individuals who are committing and 
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suffering from these acts. 
Religious violence is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon, involving, 
among other things, political, sociological, and psychological processes. A 
thorough understanding of this complex drama therefore requires analyses 
of political processes on national and international levels, social processes 
on regional levels, and psychological processes on individual levels. Political 
scientists, sociologists, and psychologists thus have the potential to explain 
different aspects of religious violence and no one interpretative scheme from 
these disciplines can by itself explain the origin, nature, and dynamic of 
religious conflicts and terrorism. 
The aim of this article is to discuss the use and usefulness of psychological 
theory and psychological methods in the study of religious violence. The focus 
on theory and method is (or at least, ought to be) self-evident in the context 
of psychological research on religious behavior. Mainstream psychological 
research aims to establish (method) facts (data) and to explain human behavior 
by discovering the underlying influences that shape the way people think, feel, 
and act (theory). The proper aim of psychological research has been debated 
among psychologists during the last decades leading to a methodological and 
theoretical rethinking in contemporary psychology (of religion) (e.g., Kvale, 
1992; Smith, 1995; Carrette, 2001; Belzen, 2009). However, most researchers 
seem to agree that there ought to be a self-corrective and growth-inducing 
feedback process between data, method, and theory in well-functioning 
psychological research. 
METHODS AND SOURCES
Political scientists and sociologists have published quite a few empirical studies 
of religious violence based on first-hand empirical data (e.g., Jurgensmeyer, 
2003; Stern, 2004; Oliver & Steinberg, 2005; Bloom, 2005). The structural, 
political and socio-economic conditions that lead to religious violence are 
thus fairly well understood. There is, however, an obvious lack of empirical 
examinations of psychological aspects of religious violence. We are then, to 
paraphrase Jerrold Post, still “primitive” in understanding the psychology of 
religious terrorism (Post, 1987). This is remarkable since religious violence is 
always committed by individuals; religious actors who have been formed by a 
religious community and who are acting with the intent to uphold, extend, or 
defend its values and precepts. 
My analysis of previous psychological research revealed an interesting 
imbalance between data, method and theory. Most studies are based on 
[  157  ]
A L - A L B A B Volume 5 Number 2 December 2016
secondary sources, such as books and newspaper reports (e.g. Avalos, 2005; 
Jones, 2008). This means that the religious perpetrators are seldom given the 
opportunity to explain the motives for their acts. This fact has, to some degree, 
been compensated by the insights we can get by reading autobiographical 
material written by terrorists (e.g., Khaled, 1973). Nevertheless, it is not 
unproblematic to base a psychological analysis exclusively upon secondary 
sources and autobiographies, the main material used in many case-studies and 
psychobiographies (e.g., Dennis, 2005). One obvious problem is related to the 
fact that secondary sources will never give the researcher any possibility to ask 
the perpetrators the theoretically saturated questions that might be needed in 
order to develop valid psychological explanations. 
The main reason for the lack of primary data on religious perpetrators is a 
lack of fieldwork. I think John Horgan is right when he says that “there is 
a worrying tendency for the ‘favorite method’ of social scientists to come 
first, when systematically devised research should first identify ‘the puzzle’. 
This has been one of the most significant problems that has bedeviled 
psychological approaches to understanding why people become terrorists. 
What psychological theorizing does exist on violence is frequently built on 
unreliable, invalid, and unverifiable data, frequently due to a lack of efforts 
to ‘go native’” (Horgan, 2005, p. 37). Thus, a certain degree of rigidity, or 
conservatism, concerning choice of methods might be one reason why we 
have a lack of primary data in psychological research on religious violence, 
but there are also other factors that complicate empirical studies on suspected 
religious terrorists. Rex A. Hudson writes: 
“Researchers have little, if any, direct access to terrorists, even 
imprisoned ones. Occasionally, a researcher has gained special access 
to a terrorist group, but usually at the cost of compromising the 
credibility of his/her research. Even if a researcher obtains permission 
to interview an incarcerated terrorist, such an interview would be of 
limited value and reliability for the purpose of making generalizations. 
Most terrorists, including imprisoned ones, would be loath to reveal 
their group’s operational secrets to their interrogators, let alone to 
journalists or academic researchers, whom the terrorists are likely to 
view as representatives of the “system” or perhaps even as intelligence 
agents in disguise. Even if terrorists agree to be interviewed in such 
circumstances, they may be less than candid in answering questions” 
(Hudson, 2005, pp.23-24).
I know, based on my own experience of collecting primary data in South 
East Asia, that it is very difficult to establish first-hand contacts with radical 
religious groups (Lindgren, 2014). However, I still think that it is possible – 
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even though it might be time-consuming – and important to establish the 
confidence-inspiring contacts that make psychological analyses of religious 
perpetrators, as well as victims, possible without compromising our credibility 
as researchers. As a matter of fact, some psychologists have succeeded to 
establish such contacts and making interesting psychological studies on 
religious violence, for example Taylor (1991), Kakar (1996), and Atran (2010). 
Moreover, there are scholars within allied fields who have gathered important 
materials of religious perpetrators during extensive fieldwork that can be (but 
is not) interpreted from a psychological perspective, for example Oliver’s and 
Stenberg’s illuminating study of suicide bombers in Palestine (2005). 
METHOD, CULTURE AND MEANING
Violence has been a part of human experience throughout human history. 
It is present in each one of us as a possibility, but that does not mean that 
we are born as religious perpetrators. On the contrary, there are empirical 
studies indicating that is quite difficult for people to overcome a profound 
disinclination to kill others, even during war and serious ethnic conflicts (e.g., 
Grossman, 1996; Scheper-Hughes, 1997). Killing, then, is something that has 
to be learned in the same way as we learn other cultural practices.
It is important to remember that religious violence is a culturally constituted 
phenomenon. As a cultural phenomenon, it is located within and between 
individuals in shared meanings and practices. These meanings are rooted in 
both the personal life histories of the participants of the violent drama and 
culturally available meanings. It is these meanings that give religious violence 
its tremendous power. The cultural construction of religious violence ought 
to have methodological and theoretical consequences since it indicates that 
various forms of religious violence can never be completely explained and 
understood in terms of a de-contextualized biology, physiology or psychology. 
To do so is to miss the point of these horrendous acts. 
The editors of The Handbook of the Psychology of Religion and Spirituality 
(2005) have argued successfully, I think, that “meaning holds much promise 
as a unifying construct in psychology” (Paloutzian & Parks, 2005, p. 13). 
However, the crucial thing here is how meaning is understood and how it is 
analyzed within the context of psychological research on religious violence. 
Israela Silberman (2005) has offered a model for analyzing how internalized 
religious meaning-systems can facilitate violent activism. Drawing on second-
hand sources, Silberman’s discussion focuses on five processes through which 
religion can facilitate religious violence, for example, that “religions often 
contain values and ideas that may facilitate prejudice, hostility, and violence 
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by encouraging the consciousness of belonging to a select and privileged 
community, and by emphasizing the ‘otherness’ of those who are not following 
the tenets of the religion or those who belong to other religions” (2005, p. 535).
Silberman’s analysis of the meaning of religious violence indicates the 
importance of taking into consideration the context of the acts; for example, 
sacred texts, doctrines, sermons, symbols, and narratives. These linguistic 
conventions are important since they stimulate and organize religious violence 
as a psychological phenomenon. However, by basing her work mainly on an 
unhistorical scriptural understanding of religions, Silberman’s analysis is 
not sensitive to how different historical and socio-cultural contexts promote 
various interpretations of a specific religious meaning-system. In other words, 
the religious meaning system is idealized as an essence rather than analyzed as 
an unfolding culture-bound dynamic of belief and behavior. Silberman offers 
then a model for analyzing how de-contextual religious meaning-systems 
can facilitate religious violence (usually in hypothetical situations, as if every 
member of a particular religion is equally prone to follow every prescription 
in the Scripture), but it can not explain with any certitude why, how and when 
certain religious discourses facilitates specific violent acts, and it can not 
explain the idiosyncratic meaning of specific violent acts in certain religious 
discourses or cultures. 
The meaning of the texts that concerns us as psychologists of religion, according 
to me, lies not in what is written into them but in what religious people read 
out of them and what they do with them. Therefore, it is very important that 
psychological research on religious violence is based on empirical approaches 
sensitive to the socio-cultural modelling of various religious meaning-systems. 
This imply that the psychologists of religion must be willing to use novel and 
creative methods sensitive to the unique cultural context where the violent 
behaviour is acted out and interpreted by the actors (perpetrator and victim) 
as well as the audience of the violent drama, for example discourse analysis 
or narrative research. These forms of analyses focus on how psychological 
phenomena are organized in actual speech and texts. Hence, the analysis 
of religious violence will focus on the discursive dimensions of religious 
violence, for example, how certain actors within a religious community secure 
a preferential right of interpretation by using various linguistic devices, and 
how priests/pastors/imams use metaphors, images, and stories in order to 
create a convincing version of an actual conflict during sermons in churches 
or mosques. In other words, the analysis focuses on the rhetoric and linguistic 
organization of religious language in speech and texts and its behavioral and 
experiential consequences. In the self-corrective and growth-inducing feedback 
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process between these methods and primary data it would be possible, I think, 
to develop valid psychological theories of religious violence. 
PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS
The simple fact that we are not born as perpetrators of religious violence 
means that we must become perpetrators one way or another. The process 
of becoming a violent perpetrator entails numerous possibilities. In order 
to understand religious violence, it is therefore important to describe and 
explain both how and why certain people choose to become part of a violent 
community while other people prefer to remain, or become, non-violent 
(which is not necessarily a passive attitude as it can entail a non-violent fight 
against oppression), even in times of serious conflicts. However, answering 
questions about why people may wish to become involved in religious violence 
may have little bearing on the answers that explain why people commit violent 
acts and why they maintain a violent pattern of behavior. 
A hallmark of religious violence is that the violent acts are coordinated by a 
group of people belonging to the same reference group. Mark Juergensmeyer 
mentions that
“It takes a community of support and, in many cases, a large 
organizational network for an act of violence to succeed. It also 
requires an enormous amount of moral presumption for the 
perpetrators of these acts to justify the destruction of property on a 
massive scale or to condone a brutal attack on another life, especially 
the life of someone one scarcely knows and against whom one 
bears no personal enmity. And it requires a great deal of internal 
conviction, social acknowledgement, and the stamp of approval 
from a legitimizing ideology or authority one respects. Because of 
the moral, ideological, and organizational support necessary for such 
acts, most of them come as collective decisions…” (Juergensmeyer, 
2003, p. 11).
This fact indicates that involvement and engagement in religious violence 
might best be understood as a process whereby an individual joins a specific 
group and internalizes its values and norms. An important area of research, 
then, is to explain how people become involved, and why certain people want 
to become involved, in violent religious groups.  
Research on militant religious groups indicates that they tend to attract people 
from relatively deprived strata of the population (Pape, 2006; Hudson, 2005; 
Atran, 2010). Contextual factors, such as political repression, marginalization, 
unemployment, and the pattern of distribution of wealth and income, thus 
may create a pool of potential recruits for terrorist acts since they have less to 
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lose and a great deal to win if the social order is changed. But intensification 
of grievances or relative deprivation is not a cause in itself of radicalization. 
Potential recruits must be convinced that their problems are not inevitable 
and therefore can be changed through collective actions.  
The process of joining a terrorist group follows, in general, a pattern quite 
similar to the pattern found in research on joining new religious movements: 
“Potential terrorist group members often start out as sympathizers of 
the group. Recruits often come from support organizations, such as 
prisoner support groups or student activist groups. From sympathizer, 
one moves to passive supporter. Often, violent encounters with 
police or other security forces motivate an already socially alienated 
individual to join a terrorist group. Although the circumstances vary, 
the end result of this gradual process is that the individual, often 
with the help of a family member or friend with terrorist contacts, 
turns to terrorism. Membership in a terrorist group, however, is 
highly selective. Over a period as long as a year or more, a recruit 
generally moves in a slow, gradual fashion toward full membership 
in a terrorist group” (Hudson, 2005, p. 24).
It is important to observe here that the process is characterized by a slow gradual 
process into committed involvement in terrorist activity and a simultaneous 
gradual movement away from conventional society (cf. Kellen, 1982; Taylor, 
1988). Moreover, it is important to observe the function of significant others 
in this process. This analysis of the process of joining a terrorist group is 
most likely valid for joining many violent religious groups as well. However, 
many questions still remain to be answered. For example, given that many 
people are exposed to the grievances that generate religious violence, very few 
will, according to recent research (e.g., Barber, 2003), proceed to increased 
engagement and subsequently become operational activists for a terrorist 
group. Why? Moreover, there are reasons to believe that the psychology of 
joining a violent religious group and acting as a religious perpetrator may 
differ between different individuals depending on, among other things, 
cultural factors. If so, how shall we account for these differences? 
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND PERSONALITY
In earlier research, it was quite common to explain violent behaviors in terms of 
psychopathology, for example, antisocial personality disorder (Cooper, 1977; 
Kellen, 1982) and narcissistic personality disorder (Post, 2004). However, it 
is important to realize that most of the studies indicating psychopathology 
among terrorist are based on secondary sources. The terrorists are thus 
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diagnosed at a distance, a quite controversial procedure that many readers 
seem to overlook. Moreover, it is true that there are some superficial similarities 
in the behavior of sociopaths and terrorists, for example, the readiness to kill, 
and a lack of empathy and compassion. But there are also many important 
differences making the explanation problematic. For example, antisocial 
personality disorders are characterized by egocentricity and an unwillingness 
to conform to communal rules. These persons are then not easily used in 
terrorist organizations or armies of any kind. Further, there are differences 
in the way the perpetrators chose victims; the sociopath kills for personal 
reasons or personal fantasies while the terrorists are motivated by ideology 
and choose symbolic victims for their acts.      
More than thirty years of first-hand empirical research has revealed little 
evidence that terrorist are suffering from any form of severe psychopathology 
(Merari, 2010). However, this does not mean that pathological personalities 
are never found in terrorists groups. Some researchers have found such 
individuals in their samples, but they “were a rarity, being the exception rather 
than the rule,” and when they do appear “such personalities tend to be fringe 
members of the terrorist group, rather than central characters” (Silke, 2003, 
p. 32). Thus, as most simple answers to difficult questions, the suggestions of 
psychopathology have proved to be a false explanation of terrorist behavior. 
As Clark McCauley put it in the following statement. 
“Indeed, terrorism would be a trivial problem if only those with 
some kind of psychopathology could be terrorists. Rather we have 
to face the fact that normal people can be terrorists under some 
circumstances. This fact is already implied in recognizing that 
military and police forces involved in state terrorism are all too 
capable of killing noncombatants. Few would suggest that the broad 
range of soldiers and policemen involved in such killing must all be 
suffering some kind of psychopathology” (McCauley, 2004, p. 37).
There are no indications that religious perpetrators would differ from terrorists 
regarding their mental health. But what about personality or personality traits? 
The reason why certain individuals seems to be more attracted to become 
members of violent groups than others, is sometimes explained in terms 
of personality or personality traits in previous psychological research (e.g., 
Shaw, 1986). For example, some terrorist leaders have been diagnosed as 
extraverterted personalities while other leaders have been diagnosed as 
neurotically hostile (Post, 1998). There are many serious problems related to 
these explanations (Taylor, 1988). In order to keep this article to a reasonable 
length, I will only highlight one problem related to cultural influences on 
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psychological functioning. 
We must take into consideration that institutionalized religious violence takes 
place in various cultural contexts and that the actors involved in the violent 
acts are cultural beings. During the last decade, several different approaches 
and methods have been used within psychological anthropology, cultural 
psychology, and cross-cultural psychology to examine the relationship 
between culture and personality. Although considerable evidence points to 
the universality of some aspects of personality, for example the five dimensions 
(“the big five”) of extraversion, neuroticism, agreeableness, conscientiousness, 
and openness (e.g., McCrae et al, 1998), a considerable amount of evidence also 
indicates the existence of indigenous constellations of personality traits (e.g., 
Ho, 1998), as well as cultural differences in supposed universal personality 
domains, such as locus of control (e.g., Hamid, 1994), self-esteem (e.g., 
Crocker & Lawrence, 1999), self-monitoring (e.g., Gudykunst et al, 1989), 
cognitive styles and field dependence (Figueroa, 1980), and authoritarianism 
(Lederer, 1982). 
Thus, cross-cultural psychological research of personality dimensions has 
revealed many ways in which cultures differ in mean levels of personality. These 
cross-cultural differences might reflect a difference in the underlying trait that 
has been measured or that personality traits are not the same across cultures. 
This indicates that it is very problematic to use personality or personality traits, 
at least as they are defined and function in a Western context, to explain why 
certain people in various non-Western cultures become attracted to violent 
religious groups. 
The focus on the proposed psychopathology of religious perpetrators, or on 
abnormal personality traits, tells us more about our own personal wishes about 
who commits violent acts than it does about the real perpetrators: it makes 
it possible for us, normal people with normal human capacities, to distance 
ourselves from them. Moreover, these explanations single out certain inherent 
characteristics of the perpetrators as the crucial factors influencing violent 
behaviors. That might illustrate a tendency among Westerners to overestimate 
internal factors and to underestimate situational factors in explaining the 
behavior of other people, the so-called “fundamental attribution error”. 
When the behavior of others are defined as “terrorist acts”, it is not a giant leap 
to declare the other as mentally deranged or deviant in one way or another; 
crazy acts are done by crazy people. This kind of reasoning is a typical example 
of circular reasoning: crazy people do crazy things and we know that they are 
crazy because they are doing crazy things. However, most research indicates 
that they are not crazy and we can not identify any single personality or 
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personality traits that can thoroughly explain violent behaviors. 
Thus, the decisions to join a violent religious group and commit violent acts 
might be a normal thing to do under certain circumstances. What are these 
circumstances? When and why do normal people commit violent acts like 
hijacking of airplanes, fake executions, denotations of vehicle bombs on 
city streets, and suicide attacks on public busses? Previous psychological 
explanations of these types of behaviors center on, among other things, 
biological factors, cognition, emotions, and social dynamics. 
BIOLOGY, COGNITION AND EVOLUTION
Psychological explanations of violent behaviors in terms of instincts, or other 
biological factors, have a long history within psychology and allied disciplines. 
One of the first representatives for this perspective was Sigmund Freud in his 
theory about dual human instincts: life instinct and death instinct. He thought 
that the death instinct is primarily directed to ourselves, but gets displaced 
onto others in certain circumstances. 
Later, Konrad Lorenz (1982) developed a theory that humans have inherited 
aggressive impulses during their evolution that might explain the way violent 
behaviors are expressed among human beings today. Theories about the 
evolutionary and neuropsychological origin of violent behaviors have been 
developed within modern biopsychology. These theories, emphasizing the 
evolutionary advantage of violent behaviors in human prehistory, explain why 
these types of behaviors have survived and they locate the origin of violent 
behaviors in specific parts of the brain (e.g., Valzelli, 1981).
The modern cognitive science of religion has explicitly addressed the problem 
of religious violence and explained it terms of cognitive and evolutionary 
psychology (e.g., Boyer, 2001; Atran, 2010). For example, Pascal Boyer’s 
explanation of fundamentalism and religious violence takes it point of 
departure in coalitional dynamics, a common feature in human interaction. 
Coalitions are a special form of association that “presupposes an activity in 
which joining is (presumably) voluntary, defection is possible, benefits accrue 
with cooperation and there is a notable cost in being a cooperator when others 
defect” (Boyer, 2001, p. 126). This form of association requires sophisticated 
computations of other peoples’ reliability, since it is very important to be 
assured of other members’ loyalty. The problem of possible defection is 
manifest in all coalitions in several ways, for instance, in a desire to punish 
those who have defected, a wish to punish those who have failed to punish the 
defectors, and a wish to “screen people by submitting them to various ordeals 
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in which they have to incur substantial costs to demonstrate their loyalty” 
(Boyer, 2001, p. 127).
Fundamentalism and religious violence, according to Boyer, can be explained 
in terms of coalition dynamics. He understand fundamentalism not as a 
religion in excess or politics in disguise, but as a reaction to the pluralism 
and value relativism of modern society. The modern society signals to the 
religious coalition that it is possible to believe and act in various ways without 
paying a heavy prize for that. This means that defection from a specific reality 
construction is not only cheap but also very likely. Religious violence thus 
“seems to be an attempt to raise the stakes, that is, to discourage potential 
defectors by demonstrating that defection is actually going to be very costly, 
that people who adopt different norms may be persecuted or even killed” 
(Boyer, 2001, p. 295). The coalitional background explains several features 
of modern fundamentalism and religious extremism, according to Boyer, for 
instance, a concern with control of public behavior; a propensity to make the 
punishment of immoral behavior public and spectacular (in order to send 
a message to potential defectors of how costly defection can be); that most 
violent acts are directed to members of the same cultural and religious group; 
that the main target usually is a local form of modernized religion (Boyer, 
2001, p. 295-296)
This explanation, mainly based on secondary sources, is interesting and 
consistent with the theoretical and methodological approach of the modern 
cognitive science of religion. But there are also obvious limitations to this 
explanation. First, the emphasis on the individual rather than the socio-
cultural factors means that he neglects political and socioeconomic factors 
in the dissemination of religious violence. Second, in spite of the fact that he 
focuses on the individual, he fails to explain individual differences in violent 
behavior on an empirical/ethnographic level. We still don’t know for sure why 
certain people join violent religious groups and commit violent acts while 
most people refuse to do so. 
David Hubbard (1978) explained individual differences in violent behaviors in 
biological terms. He examined eighty imprisoned terrorists in eleven countries 
and found that nearly 90 per cent of them had defective vestibular functions of 
the middle ear. This impairment causes poor balance and coordination and he 
suggested that it was linked with antisocial behavior designed to gain attention 
and an inability to relate to other people. His argument was, however, “fatally 
undermined by serious doubts over the validity and reliability of his work. He 
never released detailed descriptions of the data he gathered or of his analysis 
procedures, and there have been no replications of his very unusual findings 
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since” (Silke, 2003, p. 35).  
There are, nevertheless, some indications that biological factors might 
influence violent behaviors, for example, that men in general are more 
aggressive than women (e.g., Potts & Hayden, 2008) and most of the recruits 
to various terrorists groups are also young men (e.g., Sageman, 2008, Atran, 
2010). However, we do not have any valid scientific evidence that biological 
factors can exclusively explain why certain people behave in a more violent 
way than others. Biopsychology is most likely a factor in combination with 
others that might predispose some individuals to engage in religious violence. 
The identification of important biological factors and analyses of how 
biopsychology might interact with socio-cultural factors in the constitution 
and dynamic of religious violence is therefore an important area of future 
research.
PASSIONS OF VIOLENCE
It is a well-known fact in psychology that behaviors are affected by both 
cognitions and emotions. Religious violence has been interpreted as an 
emotional expression. This means, for example, that the religious perpetrators 
are interpreted as furious actors blinded by uncontrolled emotions of anger 
or hatred.  This line of reasoning is usually based on an idea of a relation 
between frustration and aggression. John Dollard (1939) thought that a sense 
of frustration appears when people are thwarted from attaining an expected 
goal and this frustration causes aggressive behavior. Consequently, when 
an aggressive behavior occurs, a frustration is identified as the cause of the 
behavior. When it is impossible to identify the cause of the frustration, the 
aggression is usually displaced on something else instead. The theory of a 
causal relation between frustration and aggression was later on developed by 
Berkowitz (1965), Runciman (1966), and Friedland (1992). It has become a 
popular explanation of terrorism and religious violence (e.g., Avalos, 2005)
Religious groups involved in various forms of violent acts are usually suffering 
from some form of economic frustration, insult or humiliation that is 
expressed in the performance of the violent attacks. Some of the members of 
these groups have experienced these sufferings and frustrations themselves 
while others have experienced them indirectly through group identification. 
We know that one motivating factor for joining violent groups is hatred and 
revenge. The theory of frustration and aggression then has its advantages as it 
highlights certain important circumstances that might function as necessary, 
though not sufficient, causes of religious violence. 
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However, there are some problems with this theory as well, particularly when 
it is applied to religious violence. First, even though there are experiments 
supporting the hypothesis that frustrations led to increased aggression on an 
individual level, some studies do not back up this argument. For instance, 
studies that take into consideration the time factor have revealed that 
frustrations are not very long-lasting, and this indicate that frustrations might 
not be a prime motivator for well-organized violent behavior. Moreover, Stanley 
Milgram’s experiments reveal that some forms of aggression are not caused by 
frustrations at all, but obedience to authorities. As will be shown below, there 
are important individual and cultural differences regarding socialization and 
obedience that might explain some features of religious violence in a more 
plausible way than the frustration-aggression theory. Finally, there are reasons 
to believe that frustrations might be a better explanation for expressive than 
instrumental violence and, as is known by now, most institutional religious 
violence, such as terrorism and ethno-religious warfare, are instrumental 
since it tends to achieve a goal beyond the violent act. 
THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE CONTEXT
We know a great deal about the power of the situation and the group processes 
by which violent behaviors are created. These processes include, for instance, 
obedience and deferring to authorities (Milgram, 1974; Bandura, 1998), peer 
pressure to conformity (Kelman & Hamilton, 1989), deindividuation of the 
actors (Kelman & Hamilton, 1989), groupthink (Janis, 1972), discounting the 
effects (Bandura, 1998), dehumanizing the victim (Brennan, 1995), training, 
and routinization of the violent acts (Grossman, 1996).     
Recent studies indicate that engagement in terrorist groups might best be 
understood as a result of idiosyncratic learning experiences. If that is true, 
then we have to focus our interest on the perpetrators’ life choices and try 
to “identify factors in any particular situation that helps us understand why 
particular life choices have been made” (Taylor & Quayle, 1994, pp. 34-35). 
Horgan has identified six situational-experiential factors – formulated as 
working hypotheses – that might predispose an individual for increased 
engagement in violent groups: (1) the degree and nature of previous relevant 
engagement, including prior knowledge of the conflict situation and exposures 
to the accompanying lures of engagement; (2) the nature and extent of relevant 
early experiences, for example victimization at the hands of security services; 
(3) the nature and extent of adult socialization, which might both affect the 
individual’s openness to increased involvement and the willingness of the 
group to accept the adept; (4) a sense of dissatisfaction or disillusionment 
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with current persona and activity; (5) the nature of the community context 
and its consequences for the individual regarding, for instance, an expected 
value of involvement; and (6) the nature and range of competing alternatives 
and opportunities (Horgan, 2005, pp. 102-103). This indicates, as Drummond 
(2002) argues, that a critical conjunction of societal events and personal 
triggers lead certain individuals to become perpetrators of religious violence. 
Horgan’s process model, based on rational choice theory, is immune to the 
aforementioned critique of the explanations that focus on personality and 
personality traits since it is not trying to explain why people become violent 
exclusively on the basis of certain internal psychological characteristics, 
but focuses instead on the interaction between the individual and external 
factors in concrete situations (for example, rewards and status enhancement 
accompanying increased involvement in a violent religious group within 
certain social strata) that might “push” the individual towards an increased 
engagement in violent terrorist groups. Nevertheless, Horgan’s model is also 
lacking in cultural sensitivity since it does not take into consideration cultural 
influences on human behavior.  
Terror management theory, a recent theory in social psychology, begins from 
the idea that humans are the only animals that are aware that they are mortal 
(Pyszcynski et al. 1997). Attitudes are substantially affected by heightened 
awareness of one’s own mortality, according to recent experimental research. 
After priming with mortality related themes, subjects are more punishing, 
less tolerant of ethnic differences (Greenberg et al. 1990), more attached to 
cultural symbols and values, and more aggressive against people who threaten 
one’s own cultural world view than controls (McGregor et al. 1998). Thus, 
attachment to social identity is a consequence of the terror induced by mortality. 
“Many cultural institutions – shared symbols, shared values, a sense of group 
membership – are seen as buffers against this natural anxiety. According to 
terror-management theorists, cultural institutions are a (somewhat illusory) 
remedy to such feelings because they provide safety and protection” (Boyer, 
2001, p. 205). Religion has proved to be a powerful terror management since it 
provides ultimate safety and protection in the face of mortality during ethnic 
and national conflicts (McCauley, 2002).
Terror management theory indicates that situations of heightened awareness 
of mortality might affect human behaviours in various cultures in similar 
ways. Thus, the influence of values of traditional cultures might not play such 
a decisive role in the socialization into violent behaviour during a violent 
conflict. This is, I believe, related to the fact that violence is mimetic and 
creates a culture of violence that affects peoples’ cognitions and behaviours 
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in a more dramatic way than traditional cultures. A culture of violence, then, 
transforms not only the geographical space, but also shared meanings and 
practices of a distinct cultural group. 
Nevertheless, the significance of a culture of violence and its impact on the 
individuals does not mean that traditional cultures are of no interest at all in 
situations of serious conflicts, because a culture of violence is always mixed 
up with cultural, beliefs, values and behaviours. A challenge for psychological 
research on religious violence is then to examine the mixture of cultures 
and their effects on the individuals. These examinations require extensive 
ethnographic research, combining various forms of primary and secondary 
data, for example, participant observations, interviews, archives, diaries, 
sermons, leaflets, daily papers, photographs, and graffiti. Drawing on these 
data, it would be possible, I think, to develop valid psychological explanations 
of how and why people in concrete situations become engaged in religious 
violence.
CLOSING REMARKS
Religious terrorism is a culturally constituted phenomenon. It is therefore 
important that research on religious violence is based on theoretical and 
empirical approaches sensitive to the cultural construction of violence. This 
means that psychologists of religion must be willing to use novel and creative 
methods sensitive to the unique cultural context where the violent behaviour 
is acted out and interpreted by the actors of the violent drama, for example, 
discourse analysis or narrative research. In the self-corrective and growth-
inducing feedback process between these methods and primary data it would 
be possible to develop valid psychological explanations of religious violence.
This work is a matter of discussion if or how religious violence is different 
from other forms of political violence. Many researchers, however, argue 
that religious violence is particularly violent (Hoffman, 1998; Laqueur, 1999; 
Harmon 2000; Jurgensmeyer, 2003; Avalos, 2005; Jones, 2008). If that is true, 
it means that psychological examinations of religious perpetrators would yield 
insights into the individuals for whom violence exists not as a dull habit, but 
as an acute fever.
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